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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION 
Review of Theories
The controversy about learning and awareness has been a 
popular topic in psychology for many years. The essence of the 
learning-awareness controversy involves the question of whether 
awareness (generally defined as correct verbalization of response- 
reinforcement contingencies) is a necessary precondition of learn­
ing or whether it simply occurs as a result of learning.
Psychologists who uphold a nonmediational, stimulus-response 
model of learning have asserted that awareness occurs as a result of 
learning (Greenspoon, 1967; Thorndike, 1933. Verplanck, 1962). 
According to this theoretical position, reinforcing consequences act 
directly and automatically to strengthen stimulus-response connections. 
If awareness does occur, it is an after-effect of this direct action.
t
Counterposed to this behavioristic interpretation of the 
relationship between learning and awareness is the position pro­
pounded by the cognitive theorists. They maintain that awareness 
is a necessary precondition of learning. The major empirical and 
theoretical support for this view has come from Spielberger and his 
associates (Spielberger, Berger, & Howard, 1963; Spielberger & Be Nike,
1
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1962; Spielberger, Levin, & Shepard, 1962; Spielberger, Ratliff, & 
Bernstein, 1966; Spielberger, Southard, & Hodges, 1966).
A third major theoretical position has been proposed which 
assumes that awareness is both a consequence and a condition of be­
havior change (Bandura, 1969; Farber, 1963; Postman & Sassenrath, 
1961.) Bandura has termed this particular formulation the "reciprocal 
interaction theory." According to this theory, a certain amount of 
learning can take place in an automatic, non-mediational fashion. 
However, during the acquisition process, subjects (Ss) not only make 
overt responses, but also formulate hypotheses about the responses 
required to produce reinforcement. Once a correct hypothesis has 
been formed, dramatic and sudden performance gains often ensue.
The learning and awareness controversy has not been settled.
A review of the literature dealing with verbal operants, problem 
solving and attitudes yields empirical data which would seem to 
support any one of three theories that have been presented. In light 
of these contradictory results, a number of psychologists have voiced 
the opinion that the learning and awareness issue may be meaningless, 
or, at least for the present, insoluble (Eriksen, 19o2; Greenspoon, 
1967; Kimble, 1962). None of these psychologists would deny, however, 
that awareness can have a marked facilitative effect upon performance.
Bandura (1969) has presented some suggestive hypotheses about 
several variables that may have been responsible for the divergent 
results that pervade the literature. He maintains that the disparate
3
findings may, in part be a consequence of the principle governing the 
administration of reinforcement and the response restrictions imposed 
by the nature of the learning task. He points out that studies in 
which awareness is concurrent with dramatic performance gains gener­
ally employ fairly simple tasks that require Ss to select from one of 
a small number of relatively unambiguous response classes. These 
response classes are readily available within S's repertoire (i.e.,
S may more adequately be described as choosing from response alter­
natives already in his repertoire rather than as acquiring new responses). 
An example of, a task of this sort would be the sentence construction 
task devised by Taffel (1955)• In this task, Ss are instructed to 
construct a short sentence by choosing one of a small number of pro­
nouns, adjectives, verbs or nouns printed on cards. Commonly the 
experimenter (E) reinforces the emission of a predetermined response 
class (e.g., human nouns, intensely hostile adjectives) by saying 
'•good.»
Using a task such as this is likely to produce awareness and 
learning as a one-trial event rather than as an incremental process.
While a cognitive theorist might consider a one-trial event as evi­
dence for awareness being a necessary precondition of behavior change, 
such an assertion, from the writer's point of view, seems too extrava­
gant. The experimental unit of a learning trial is, after all, just 
a convenient way of designating what is probably a rather complex 
process of some duration. If two performances are assessed at the
I*
termination of a learning trial— verbalized awareness and behavior 
change— all that one can strictly and objectively state is that both 
have occurred during that interval of time. To say that awareness 
is a necessary precondition of learning seems premature. The reci­
procal interaction theory as interpreted by Bandura simply states that 
given a certain context (a relatively simple verbal operant task) 
awareness and behavior change are likely to occur ‘'together" rather 
than "apart." The theoretical issue of whether awareness must mediate 
behavior change is left open.
If awareness and behavior change are likely to occur together 
in a simple verbal operant task like the one devised by Taffel, the 
most probable outcome that a reciprocal interaction theory would 
predict is the same outcome that a cognitive theory might predict, 
though for different reasons— performance gains only by aware Ss. 
Spielberger’s repeated findings of performance gains only for aware 
Ss in the Taffel task seems to lend support to Bandura's contentions 
about task complexity.
There also seems to be some supporting evidence for Bandura's 
contention that a more difficult or complex task is likely to produce 
performance gains for Ss that are unaware. Philbrick and Postman 
(1955) obtained results in line with this prediction using a task 
in which Ss were required to respond with a number between 2 and 9 
when they were presented a stimulus word varying in length from two 
to ten letters. The reinforcement contingency which if learned would
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produce 100$ reinforcement was: choose a number which is equal to
the number of letters in the stimulus word minus one, e.g., test-3, 
telephone-8, and so forth. Sassenrath (1962) also found performance 
gains for unaware Ss using a task similar to the one used by Philbrick 
and Postman. Thus in comparison to the procedure developed by Taffel, 
these tasks appear to be relatively complex as a function of several 
variables (e.g., the complexity of the principle governing reinforce­
ment and the number of possible response alternatives).
Statement of Problem
Although Bandura’s hypotheses concerning the degree of task 
complexity originated in an attempt to explicate divergent findings 
in the area of verbal operants, problem solving and the like, it 
appeared that the analysis could be extrapolated to clarify certain 
puzzling results in the area of attitude conditioning. A case in 
point is the finding of attitude conditioning of unaware Ss (Hildum 
& Brown, 1956; Insko & Butzine, 1967; Insko & Nelson, 1969)® Rather 
than considering the possibility that such findings might be a result 
of task complexity, these experimenters have explained their results 
by contending that Ss perceive and interact with attitude material 
in a fashion fundamentally different from that in which they deal 
with nonnormative material. For example, Hildum and Brown maintain 
that the attitude situation "makes sense" as presented. Consequently,
6
Ss do not attend so closely to E's reinforcing statements (e.g., 
"good"). Insko contends that Ss automatically defer to the attitude 
E is reinforcing with little attention to what is going on. Insko 
speculates that people have learned to defer rather than oppose other's 
opinions and attitudes in order to avoid the aversive consequences 
(social friction) that might otherwise ensue.
The purpose of the present study was to consider the findings 
of the attitude conditioning situation from the point of view of 
possible complexity involved. It seemed reasonable that Bandura's 
notions might apply in this situation and that, to the extent this 
was the case, the postulation of processes peculiar to the attitude 
situation was unnecessary.
Pilot Study
One possible source of complexity that appeared to be operating 
in the attitude conditioning situation involved the availability and
j
ambiguity of response classes. The work of Insko (1967, 19&9) is a 
case in point. Insko's attitude questionnaire (See Appendix I) was 
designed to deal with an issue that seemed from the writer's point 
of view, somewhat foreign to a number of people— the issue of Free 
TV versus Pay TV. Thus it seemed reasonable to suppose that the 
attitudes represented by the items might not be readily available in 
S's repertoire. In addition, inspection of the items yielded a 
feeling of great ambiguity; i.e., the writer often questioned whether
7
or not a particular item would be perceived by S as "pro” or "con"
Pay TV. Accordingly, a pilot study was designed to assess these 
notions. In addition a second attitude questionnaire was devised 
by the writer (hereafter referred to as the Theoretical Attitude 
Questionnaire; see Appendix II) and included in the pilot work in 
an attempt to overcome the complexity thought to be present in Insko*s 
questionnaire. The items in the Theoretical Attitude Questionnaire 
were derived from or suggested by the Study of Values (Allport,
Vernon, & Lindzey, i960). They were written in such a way as to 
attempt to avoid ambiguity and they dealt with an issue which seemed 
more widely shared. Both questionnaires contained twelve items.
Each S in one group of 15 Ss was presented the items included 
in Insko*s attitude questionnaire, half of which are meant to be 
favorable towards Pay TV and half of which are meant to be unfavorable. 
Each attitude item was typed on a 3 x 5  inch card and arranged randomly 
in a deck. The S was given the deck and was instructed that it con­
sisted of IE attitude statements which could be sorted into two 
different and distinct categories. The S was also told not to 
separate the attitude statements on the basis of how he personally 
felt about the items. The E recorded how long it took each S to 
complete the sorting task and how many errors in placement occurred.
Each S in the second group of 15 Ss was given a deck of the 
twelve items from the Theoretical Attitude Questionnaire. Six of 
these items were favorable towards a theoretical interest and six
8
were unfavorable towards a theoretical interest. The Ss in this group 
received the same instructions as the group that received Insko's 
v questionnaire.
The mean time for placement in the group that received Insko's 
questionnaire was 114.5 sec.; the mean time for placement in the 
group that received the Theoretical Attitude Questionnaire was 78.5 
sec.. The total number of incorrect placements in the group that 
received Insko's items was 24; the total number of errors in place, 
ment for the group that received the Theoretical items was 11.
At the termination of the task each S was asked on what basis 
he had made his sorting. Only three Ss in the group that received 
the Theoretical Attitude Questionnaire showed any difficulty in 
identifying the categories. These Ss gave what amounts to "correlated" 
hypotheses; e.g., one S replied, "One had something to do with beauty 
and creating things and the other was about science and stuff like 
that."
Seven Ss who received Insko's items seemed to have some 
difficulty in identifying the basis of their sorting. One of these 
Ss sorted the cards into one stack that contained items 6 and 10 arid 
another stack that contained all of the other items, When asked the 
basis of his sorting, S replied that he had sorted the cards into 
one stack that dealt with commercials and one stack that dealt with 
entertainment.
9
Since the group that was presented the items from Insko*s 
attitude questionnaire had a greater mean time to complete the card 
sorting task, made more errors in placement, and appeared to have 
greater difficulty in identifying the "correct" response classes, 
it seemed reasonable to conclude that the Theoretical attitude task 
was less complex. It also seemed reasonable to conclude that this 
was due, at least in part, to availability and lack of ambiguity of 
response classes in the Theoretical Attitude Questionnaire, as compared 
with Insko*s questionnaire.
Further Considerations
A second source of complexity that seemed likely to be oper­
ating in the attitude conditioning situation involved the nature of 
the response alternatives present on any given trial. Hildum and 
Brown, as well as Insko and his associates, have consistently employed 
a task (e.g., Insko’s questionnaire) in which either a favorable or 
an unfavorable item is present on each tidal, but not both. It may 
be that the opportunity to compare stimuli simultaneously can be a 
distinct help in the learning of relationships among stimuli (Deese 
& Hulse, 1967). Although such a statement is most directly related 
to the phenomenon of transposition, it seems relevant to the present 
issue. The attainment of awareness may be viewed as the learning 
of a relationship between a reinforcing stimulus and several other 
classes of stimuli. Perhaps the lack of explicit presentation of
10
both favorable and unfavorable classes of responses on each trial 
militates against a one-trial learning and awareness event. In 
point of fact, in the Taffel task, where one-trial learning and 
awareness has been found to occur, both the reinforced and non­
reinforced classes are explicitly present on each trial of the 
experiment.
A test of this hypothesis would require a comparison of the 
performance of Ss given two questionnaires having the same content 
and equated in terms of availability and lack of ambiguity but 
differing in terms of the number of response classes present on 
each trial. In order to do this, E devised a questionnaire dealing 
with S’s theoretical attitudes which was as comparable as seemed 
possible to the Theoretical Attitude Questionnaire, except that 
both favorable and unfavorable classes of responses were present 
on each trial (see Appendix III). This questionnaire will here­
after be referred to as the Theoretical-Aesthetic Attitude 
Questionnaire.
Summary and Predictions
In summary, it was hypothesized that Ss do not perceive and 
interact with normative material in a fashion fundamentally different 
from the way in which they deal with nonnormative material. It was 
felt that the reported findings of performance gains for unaware Ss 
in several attitude conditioning experiments was a consequence of
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the complexity of the task rather than, for example, some inaccessible, 
automatic deference response. Three potential sources of complexity 
present in the attitude questionnaires used by the experimenters who 
have reported significant performance gains for unaware Ss were 
considered. These were: availability of response classes, compara­
tive difficulty of identifying an attitude item as an instance of an 
attitude class (ambiguity), and explicit presentation of reinforced 
and nonreinforced response classes on each trial of an experiment.
An experiment was designed to test the validity of these 
ideas. Two attitude questionnaires were developed in such a way as 
to deal with each of the three hypothesized sources of complexity.
One of the questionnaires (the Theoretical Attitude Questionnaire) 
was designed to be simpler by virtue of the greater availability of 
the response classes involved and the lesser ambiguity of the items. 
Pilot work suggested the attempt had been successful. The other 
questionnaire (the Theoretical-Aesthetic Attitude Questionnaire) 
was designed to be comparable to the Theoretical Questionnaire in 
terms of these two sources of complexity, but to introduce a further 
simplification— the explicit presence of both favorable and unfavorable 
responses on each trial of the experiment. An attitude conditioning 
experiment was then conducted, the major purpose of which was to 
compare the performances on each of the two newly-devised questionnaires . 
and the more traditional questionnaire employed by Insko.
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Based upon the verbal conditioning literature which has dealt 
with nonnormative material, the following predictions were made:
(1) There should be fewer aware Ss in a group that receives 
Insko!s attitude questionnaire than in a group that 
receives the Theoretical Attitude Questionnaire. This 
first prediction follows from the contention that the 
Theoretical Attitude Questionnaire is relatively less 
complex when compared to Insko's questionnaire, and 
the general findings in the literature that the easier 
or less complex the task is, the greater will be the 
number of aware Ss,
(2) In a relatively complex task such as Insko *s the 
possibility exists that some Ss will show significant 
performance gains but be unaware of the experimental 
reinforcement contingencies. In a relatively easy 
attitude task such as the Theoretical Attitude task 
the possibility of performance gains for unaware Ss 
should be greatly reduced. It is more likely that 
performance gains should be limited to only aware Ss. 
This prediction is derived from Bandura's notion that 
a more complex or difficult task is likely to produce 
performance gains by unaware Ss, but a fairly simple 
task is likely to produce a one-trial learning and 
awareness process, and thus, performance gains only 
for aware Ss.
(3) The mean number of responses favorable to the attitude 
class E is reinforcing should be greater for a group 
that receives the Theoretical Attitude Questionnaire 
than for a group that receives Insko's questionnaire. 
This prediction follows from the contention that there 
will be more aware Ss in the group given the Theoretical 
Attitude Questionnaire than in a group given Insko's 
questionnaire, and the general findings in the litera­
ture that awareness is a sufficient condition for sudden 
and dramatic performance gains.
(k) There should be more aware Ss in a group that receives 
the Theoretical-Aesthetic Attitude Questionnaire than 
in a group that receives either the Theoretical Attitude 
Questionnaire or Insko's questionnaire. This prediction 
follows from the contention that explicit presentation
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of both reinforced and nonreinforced response classes 
on each trial of an experiment simplifies a task even 
more than if only the two sources of complexity (un­
availability and ambiguity) are removed as in the 
Theoretical Attitude Questionnaire. Since all sources 
of hypothesized complexity are still potentially 
present in Insko*s questionnaire, it follows that there 
should be more aware Ss in the Theoretical-Aesthetic 
group where all sources of hypothesized complexity 
have been removed.
(5) The mean number of responses favorable to the attitude 
class E is reinforcing should be greater in a group 
that receives the Theoretical-Aesthetic Questionnaire 
than in a group that receives either Insko’s question­
naire or the Theoretical Questionnaire. Again, this 
prediction follows from the notion that a simpler task 
produces more aware Ss. If there are more aware Ss 
in one group than in another, assuming that the groups 
are of equal size, and awareness is correlated with 
dramatic performance gains, then the mean performance 
score for the group containing the most aware Ss should 
be greater than the mean performance score for the 
group containing fewer aware Ss.
CHAPTER II
METHOD
Subjects
The Ss were 120 undergraduate students enrolled in the intro­
ductory psychology class at the University of Montana. These students 
were participating in the experiment in order to complete a course 
requirement. Each S was randomly assigned to one of six groups.
There were 20 Ss in each group.
Attitude Questionnaires
There were three attitude questionnaires. The content of 
two of these questionnaires were suggested by the study of values 
(Allport, Vernon, & Lindzey, i960). The Study of Values attempts to 
measure the relative prominence of six interests or motives in 
personality: theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social, political,
and religious. In general, this test is organized so that a prefer­
ence for one interest is paired with a preference for another interest 
and the individual taking the test assigns relative weights (3,2,1,0) 
to one or both of the interests. In this study only items similar in 
content to two of the six value classes were used— the theoretical and 
the aesthetic. Also, rather than assign relative weights to the value
lk
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classest Ss were instructed either to state a preference for one or the 
other of the value classes (Theoretical-Aesthetic Attitude Questionnaire) 
or to agree or disagree with a statement which expressed a positive 
evaluation of one of the value classes (Theoretical Attitude Question­
naire). Insko's pay TV— free TV questionnaire was the third question­
naire used.
Each of the three attitude questionnaires was administered to 
Ss; 20 Ss received the experimental reinforcement treatment and 
20 Ss served as a control group. The experimental Ss who received 
Insko’s questionnaire were reinforced for expressing either agreement 
with a statement favoring pay TV or disagreement with a statement 
favoring free TV. The experimental Ss who received the Theoretical 
Attitude Questionnaire were reinforced for either agreeing with state­
ments expressing a theoretical interest or disagreeing with a statement 
expressing an aesthetic interest. The experimental Ss who received 
the Theoretical-Aesthetic Attitude Questionnaire were reinforced when 
they indicated that the theoretical alternative was their preference.
All of the attitude statements were typed on white 3 x 5  inch 
cards. The order of presentation of the twelve statements in each of 
the three attitude, questionnaires was randomized* The attitude state­
ments were presented through an aperture on a black screen in order 
to eliminate visual contact with the Ss. The exposure time of the 
statements varied as a function of the type and complexity of the
16
statements. There was a five second intertrial period between the 
presentation of successive statements.
Procedure
When each S arrived, E told him that the experiment dealt 
with people's attitudes about either pay TV or science, depending 
upon the group to which he was assigned. The E explained that S 
would be administered a questionnaire consisting of twelve statements 
typed on cards, and that these cards would be presented through a 
slot in the black screen. Each S was instructed to read each state­
ment aloud. When an experimental S responded favorably toward either 
Pay TV or a theoretical interest, E said "good" in a flat, unemotional 
tone. Nothing was said when S responded favorably toward free TV or 
an aesthetic interest. Control Ss simply read the statements, and 
never received reinforcement.
After each experimental S had been administered one of the 
three questionnaires, E asked him the questions (somewhat modified 
for the purposes of this experiment) included in Dulany's awareness 
questionnaire (see Appendix IV). Each S was then informed about the 
nature of the experiment and requested not to discuss the experiment 
with anyone who might participate in it at some future time.
Appendix V presents the exact instructions given Ss that 
received each of the three attitude questionnaires. Also, after
17
the experiment was underway E found it necessary to create some 
additional instructions for the group that received Insko’s question­
naire (see Appendix VI for these instructions and the reasons that 
necessitated their creation).
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Measurement of Awareness
The criteria used to classify Ss as aware or unaware were 
taken from Dulany (1961) and were as follows:
(1) Aware— the subject reports the significance of the
contingent stimulus. The subject signifies that
the preceding response was correct or what E wanted 
or would agree with. The contingent stimulus is 
described as having some selective reinforcement or 
informative value, not as a general encouragement 
to continue.
(2) Unaware— the subject reports one of several things:
an incorrect or incompatible response class, the
occurrence but neither the significance nor the 
distribution of the contingent stimulus, or does 
not report the occurrence of the contingent 
stimulus.
Table 1 presents the number of aware and unaware Ss in each 
of the experimental groups. It was hypothesized that there would be 
more aware Ss in a task where both reinforced and nonreinforced response 
classes were explicitly present on each trial of the experiment than 
there would be in a task where only one of the response classes was 
present on each trial. The former situation is represented in Table 1 
by the Theoretical-Aesthetic task while the latter situation is 
represented by the Theoretical task. A Chi Square test was performed
18
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in order to ascertain whether being in one group or the other had an
effect on the proportion of aware Ss in these groups. This test was 
osignificant (x = 3.95, P <  «05). A task in which both response 
classes are present on each trial of the experiment does produce more 
aware Ss.
It was also hypothesized that there would be more aware Ss in 
a group given the Theoretical task than in a group given Insko's task. 
Inspection of Table 1 indicates that this prediction was not confirmed.
Table i
Number of Ss Hated as Aware or Unaware 
in Each of Three Experimental Groups
Aware Unaware
10 10 Insko’s Attitude Task
10 10 Theoretical Task
16 4 Theoretical-Aesthetic Task
Response Acquisition
Table Z presents the data relevant to treatment effects. It 
was hypothesized that there would be treatment effects for .all experi-
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mental groups. Differences between the means of experimental and 
control groups were evaluated by t tests between the means of indepen­
dent samples. The difference between the control and experimental 
means for the Theoretical-Aesthetic group was significant (t = 2.49, 
df = 38, p <  .025). Reinforcing theoretical preferences with "good" 
did have the expected effect of increasing the emission of this 
response. The comparison of means for the control and experimental 
groups of the Theoretical task approached a conventional level of 
significance (t = 1.57, df = 38, p ^  .07). However, inspection of 
Table 3 where treatment means have been computed for both aware and 
unaware Ss in this group yields a more substantial treatment effect.
A comparison of the mean of the aware Ss (unaware Ss excluded) with 
their appropriate controls was significant (t = 1.76, df = 28, p <  .05).
Table 2
Mean and Standard Deviations of the Number of Responses in 
the Direction of Reinforcement (Theoretical Responses or 
Responses Favorable Towards Pay TV) For All Groups
Experimental
5.5
SD=2.09
Control
5.3
SD=3.31 Insko's Attitude Task
6.0
SD=1.78
5.2
SD=1.44 Theoretical Task
SEfcl.96
5.8
SD=2.27 Theoretical-Aesthetic Task
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This means that although aware Ss did give significantly more
responses favoring a theoretical interest, this result was obscured 
by computing a treatment mean that included the scores of unaware Ss 
who did not give significantly more responses favoring a theoretical 
interest. This situation and the consequent computation of treatment 
effects based on the mean of only aware Ss is common in the literature. 
It is easy to see that the obscuring of treatment effects by the 
presence of unaware Ss did not occur in the group that received the 
Theoretical-Aesthetic questionnaire since there are so few unaware Ss, 
The t value for the comparison of means in the Insko attitude task 
was nonsignificant (t <  1).
Table 3
Mean Number of Responses in the Direction of Reinforcement
for Aware and Unaware Ss in the Three Experimental Groups
Insko’s Attitude Task
Aware
Unaware
'5.7
5.3
Theoretical Task
Aware
Unaware
6.2
5.8
Theoretical-Aesthetic Task
Unaware
Aware 7M
6.25
22
Response Acquisition and Awareness
It was hypothesized that only aware Ss would show any evidence 
of learning in the Theoretical-Aesthetic or Theoretical groups. The 
comparison of the mean of the aware Ss of the Theoretical-Aesthetic 
group with their appropriate controls was significant (t = 2.10, 
df = 28, p <  .025). The comparison of means for unaware Ss and 
their appropriate controls was nonsignificant (t <  1). The compari­
son of means for aware Ss and their appropriate controls in the 
Theoretical group was significant as already reported. The comparison 
of the mean of the unaware Ss with their appropriate controls was 
nonsignificant (t c  1). Neither the aware nor unaware Ss that 
received the attitude questionnaire devised by Insko showed any 
significant learning.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
In general the results for the groups that received the atti­
tude questionnaires devised by E were consistent with predicted outcomes. 
The Theoretical-Aesthetic treatment which was most similar to the 
verbal operant task devised by Taffel (response class availability 
and explicit presentation of both reinforced and nonreinforced classes 
of responses on each trial of the experiment) yielded significant 
reinforcement effects and a large proportion of aware Ss. Also 
consonant with the repeated findings of Spielberger and his associates, 
there was no evidence for learning by £s who could not verbalize the 
experimental reinforcement contingencies.
The group that received the Theoretical treatment where only 
one class of responses was explicitly present on each trial of the 
experiment also performed as predieted— nearly significant treatment 
effects, significantly fewer aware Ss than the group that received 
the Theoretical-Aesthetic treatment, and no evidence of learning by 
unaware Ss. This task is similar to the relatively simple Taffel 
Task in that the response classes are readily available within the Ss 
repertoire and is different since only the reinforced or the non­
reinforced class of responses is explicitly present on each trial.
The lack of explicit presentation of both classes of responses seems
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to have the effect of introducing some degree of task complexity, thus 
producing fewer aware Ss and somewhat less substantial treatment 
effects.
Although it was originally hypothesized that the magnitude of 
difference between the experimental and control groups of the Theoretical- 
Aesthetic group would be significantly greater than the magnitude of 
difference between experimental and control groups of the Theoretical 
treatment group thus indicating, along with the proportion of aware Ss, 
a greater degree of task simplicity, the disparate way in which the 
control Ss in these two groups responded does not allow one to make 
any straightforward comparisons. While it was assumed that the two
Iquestionnaires would be equivalent (Ss would give the same number of 
pro-theoretical responses to each questionnaire) there is enough of 
a mean difference (.6) to suggest that the questionnaires were not 
equivalent in this respect. If they are not equivalent, then different 
individuals are confounded with different tests and no rigorous
i
comparison can be performed. The magnitude of difference was, however, 
in the predicted direction (1.^ for the Theoretical-Aesthetic group
and .8 for the Theoretical group).
In summary, an attitude task which was designed to be similar
to the nonnormative verbal operant Taffel task in terms of availability
of response classes and/or explicit presentation of response classes 
yields results which are highly consonant with results obtained when
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using the verbal operant task. When sources of complexity are elimi­
nated from normative tasksf Ss do not perceive and interact with them 
in a fundamentally different fashion than the way they deal with non- 
normative tasks. Certainly these results also stand in stark contrast 
to the results that would be expected if one entertained a theory 
such as Insko's that postulates '‘automatic tinconscious deference 
responses." The Ss may have "deferred" but in as much as they did, 
they were aware of what they were doing.
The hypotheses that were entertained regarding Insko's Free 
TV— Pay TV attitude task were not confirmed— there were no treatment 
effects and no learning by unaware Ss. Although this summarizes the 
results for the Insko group, it does not express the frustration and 
difficulty E encountered in trying to administer and to interpret 
the results of the Insko questionnaire. The E found it necessary to 
introduce some additional instructions in order to break up what he 
interpreted as a good-bad evaluative set that led to a lack of 
response variability (see Appendix VI).
The introjection of these remarks did seem to break up the 
good-bad evaluative set. This procedure did have the effect, however, 
of rendering inconclusive several of the hypotheses entertained with 
regard to Insko's task. Two of the three features of Insko's attitude 
questionnaire that E thought may have introduced task complexity—  
response class availability and ability to correctly identify a
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particular response as a member of a class of responses— may have 
been in part eliminated by these added instructions. This may have 
been instrumental in increasing the number of aware Ss in the Insko 
group; indeed, the number of aware Ss in this group was equal to the 
number of aware Ss in the Theoretical group when it was hypothesized 
that there would be less. It is conceivable that the only source of 
task complexity that may have been untampered with was the lack of 
explicit presentation of both reinforced and nonreinforced classes 
of responses on each trial. Although the foregoing speculation 
might account for the number of aware Ss, it does not account for 
the nonsignificant treatment effects for the Insko group. If the 
Insko questionnaire was completely equivalent to the Theoretical 
task devised by E, one would expect significant treatment effects 
also. One possible explanation for this disparity might be in terms 
of "demand characteristics." Students enrolled in an introductory 
psychology course and participating in an experiment in which 
theoretical (scientific) preferences were being reinforced may have 
been more motivated to "play the game." The Ss in the Insko group, 
perceiving less connection between the content of the items and the 
context of the laboratory may have been less inclined to cooperate.
The inability to replicate the "Insko Effect" renders untested, 
at least for this experiment, Bandura’s hypothesis that some learning 
may occur for Ss unaware of the experimental contingencies in a
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complex task. However, in light of the findings for the two attitude 
questionnaires devised by the writer, any assertion that individuals 
perceive and interact with normative material differently from the 
way in which they deal with nonnormative material must be seriously 
questioned.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the 
contention made by Insko and others that people perceive and interact 
with normative material in a fashion that is fundamentally different 
from the way in which they deal with nonnormative material. It was 
maintained that the reported finding of attitude conditioning of 
unaware Ss was a result of task complexity rather than some intrinsic 
difference between normative tasks (attitudes) and nonnormative tasks 
(verbal operants, problem solving, etc.).
Novel attitude questionnaires were constructed which the 
writer believed would be free of potential sources of task complexity. 
It was predicted that Ss given these relatively simple questionnaires 
in an attitude conditioning experiment would not show any performance 
gains unless they were aware. This prediction was confirmed.
The results of this experiment may indicate that it is not 
possible to "influence" an individual’s attitude without his awareness 
of this "influence" process. This may be especially the case when 
attitude material is presented in an unambiguous fashion and when 
the individual has a fair prior knowledge of the attitude position.
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INSKO’S QUESTIONNAIRE
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INSKO'S QUESTIONNAIRE
1. Viewer selectivity, not pay TV, is the way to improve TV quality.
2. Pay TV firms want to "horn in" on facilities that free TV has 
built.
3. Pay TV would end the. current "wasteland" produced on free TV.
4. A large segment of intelligent America is being virtually 
ignored by the producers of current free TV.
5. Pay TV would bring live Broadway plays and exclusive sports 
events to everyone's television set.
6. Many TV commercials are well executed and enjoyable to watch.
7. Pay TV is within the price range of most people owning sets.
8. Pay TV will bring cultural events to outlying areas which
otherwise would have no opportunity to see them.
9. Pay TV would not offer much you cannot see now for free.
10. The reduction or elimination of commercials from television would
hurt the American economy.
11. Since advertising either cannot, or believes it cannot, support 
certain high-quality programs, a ready-made audience awaits 
widespread pay TV.
12. No private interest, such as those who propose to operate pay 
TV, has the right to profit from publicly owned airwaves by 
charging for receiving programs over those airwaves.
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THEORETICAL ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE
In my opinion no community should be without an organized group 
that sponsors and promotes good music.
If I were a university professor and had the necessary ability,
I would prefer to teach life sciences.
I think that modem society’s single most pressing need is 
attunement with and appreciation of natural beauty.
Investigating the principles of electronics would be a meaningful 
and fulfilling endeavor for me.
The most insightful and warm people that I know are artistically 
and emotionally sensitive.
I would find a field trip to investigate the geographical features 
of an area very worthwhile.
Nothing would be quite as much fun as a truly artistic bent for 
photography.
I think that our modern industrial and scientific developments 
are signs of a greater degree of civilization than has ever been 
attained by any previous society.
If I could influence the educational policies of a slum school,
I would first of all make provision for additional laboratory 
facilities.
If I attended an exposition, I would benefit most from going to 
the building where I could see the floral displays and paintings.
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11. I would find a course in the romantics exceedingly interesting.
12. The Moon landing was probably the most inspiring special on T.V.
APPENDIX III
THEORETICAL-AESTHETIC ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE
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THEORETICAL-AESTHETIC ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE
In my opinion no community should be without a group that sponsors 
and promotes:
(1) good music (b) vocational-technical training
If I were a university professor and had the necessary ability,
I would prefer to teach:
(a) creative writing (b) life sciences
I think that modern society's single most pressing need is:
(a) attunement with and appreciation of natural beauty
(b) a rigorous and logical approach to environmental problems 
A meaningful and fulfilling endeavor for me would be investi­
gating the principles of:
(a) poetic imagery (b) electronics
The most insightful and warm people that I know are:
(a) logical and factual
(b) artistically and emotionally sensitive
I would find it very worthwhile to go on a field trip to 
investigate:
(a) the geographical features of an area
(b) Indian art
Nothing would be quite as much fun as:
(a) a truly artistic bent for photography
(b) an ability to conceptualize nature in a purely numerical way
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8. I think that our modem society has attained a greater degree 
of civilization than any other previous society by virtue of:
(a) modem industrial and scientific developments
(b) modern architecture
9. If I could influence the educational policies of a slum school, 
I would first of all make provision for additional:
(a) laboratory facilities
(b) creative (artistic) facilities
10. If I attended an exposition I would benefit most from going to 
the buildings where I could see:
(a) floral displays and paintings
(b) a new combustion engine being displayed
11. I would find it exceedingly interesting to take a course in the:
(a) thought of the romantics
(b) physical theories of the origins of the Earth
12. Probably the most inspiring special on T.V. in the last five 
years was:
(a) the Moon landing
(b) Auguste Rodin: The Mystic Sculptor
APPENDIX IV
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DULANY'S AWARENESS QUESTIONNAIRE
1. Did you notice whether or not I said anything during the 
experiment?
2. (a) Did you come to think it was random or did it follow anything 
in particular you did? (b) What?
3» (a) Did you come to think there was or wasn't any purpose or
significance to the word "Good" in this experiment? (b) What?
4. (a) Did you come to think that there was anything you were supposed
to say, or not say, on each trial in order to be correct— something 
the experimenter wanted you to say or not say? (b) What?
(c) Did you come to think there was or wasn't any kind of correct 
response?
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INSTRUCTIONS
Group I (Theoretical-Aesthetic Attitude Questionnaire)
"You will be administered a questionnaire that is 
concerned with individuals1 attitudes towards science. 
There are twelve statements or questions with two 
alternative answers. Each of the statements is typed 
on a card and will be presented to you in this slot 
(E points to the slot on the screen). I want you 
to read each statement aloud and tell me which of 
the alternative answers best indicates your personal 
preference. For example, if I present you with this 
card (E puts a card in the slot on the screen) which 
reads,’"'Which of the following sports do you find the 
most exciting to watch? (a) football (b) baseball',
I want you to read the statement aloud and indicate 
your preference by choosing one of the two alternative 
answers. Please do that now."
Group II (Theoretical Attitude Questionnaire)
"You will be administered a questionnaire that is 
concerned with individuals' attitudes towards science.
There are twelve statements or questions. Each of 
these statements is typed on a card and will be pre­
sented to you in this slot (E points to the slot 
on the screen). I want you to read each statement 
aloud and tell me whether you agree or whether you 
disagree with each of the statements. For example, 
if I present this card to you (E puts a card into 
the slot on the screen) which reads, 'I find it more 
exciting to watch football than any other sport', I 
want you to read the statement aloud and tell me 
whether you agree or whether you disagree with the 
statement. Will you please do that now?"
After S gave his response, E asked if there were any questions 
about the procedure.
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Group III (Insko’s attitude questionnaire)
"You will be administered a questionnaire that is 
concerned with individuals1 attitudes towards pay 
T.V. There are twelve statements. Each of these 
statements is typed on a card and will be presented 
to you in this slot (E points to the slot on the 
screen). I want you to read each of these state­
ments aloud and tell me whether you agree or whether 
you disagree with each statement. For example, . . . 
(same as for Group II).
APPENDIX VI
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ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS
The E had reason to believe, on the basis of the pilot study 
reported in the introduction, that Ss would have difficulty with 
Insko's questionnaire. This apprehension proved even more trouble­
some than had been anticipated. The first four Ss who were admini­
stered Insko's questionnaire gave virtually all responses in favor 
of free T.V. The only exception to this pattern were the responses
to items 6 and 10 in Insko's questionnaire which deal with commercials.
This meant that Ss gave no reinforceable responses. The E thought 
that perhaps these Ss were responding on the basis of an evaluative 
set— "free" is good; "pay" is bad. The E felt that the only way to 
introduce some response variability was to preface the administration 
of this questionnaire with some brief comments about the pay T.V.—  
free T.V. controversy. The following additional instructions were 
given;
"The pay T.V.— free T.V. controversy was hotly debated 
several years ago. The present way in which T.V. is 
organized is on a free basis. That is, after you have
purchased a television set you do not have to pay any
additional money to television networks or stations.
The money needed to finance T.V. is provided by adver­
tising and commercials. If T.V. were organized on a 
pay basis you would have to pay a certain sum of money 
in order to view T.V. for a period of time, say an hour, 
or in order to watch certain desired programs. People 
that favor the pay T.V. setup have argued that since 
individuals would provide the necessary money to finance 
T.V., there would be no more commercials. Since these 
people consider that many commercials are either boring
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or an insult to one’s intelligencet they regard the 
elimination of commercials as a veiy good outcome.
On the other hand, people in favor of the present
system (free T.V.) argue that commercials are often
entertaining and that elimination of commercials 
would hurt the American economy. Anyway, there are 
many arguments both pro and con concerning this 
issue.”
It is interesting to note that after the present study was 
underway the writer read a recent study by Insko (Insko & Cialdini,
1969) in which some of the same difficulty (response class availability) 
experienced by the writer was evident. Insko found that 15 of the 75 
Ss that he initially sampled were not familiar with the Pay T.V.
issue. Insko states that since he had not experienced this problem
in previous studies, the issue must be becoming dated.
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